The Chappell-Hadlee trophy between New Zealand and Australia has produced some of the most remarkable ODI’s in the history of the game. The series boasts a rich history of epic run chases since its creation in 2004, with the underdog New Zealand side often proving it is never over till it is over. After a small hiatus, the competition returned in 2014. On the 30th of January in the 1st Chappell-Hadlee ODI of 2017, it was Australia, or perhaps more accurately one Australian batsman, who almost achieved an historic run chase. Marcus Stoinis played an extraordinary innings, scoring 146* off 117 balls, hitting 9 fours and 11 sixes (the second most sixes in an innings by an Australian.
His record breaking innings came to an end when he tried to remain on strike for a 5th consecutive over and his partner, Josh Hazlewood, was run out at the other end. The Kiwis had switched onto this last ball dash strategy the preceding overs and despite not being able to convert the run-out chances – the field was still set to close off any possibility for a single. The last ball dash strategy is linked directly with the perceived low ability of the batsman at the non-strikers’ end. The number 11 has obviously a far greater chance of being dismissed as well as a lesser ability to score the winning runs. However, is this enough justification to risk an almost certain run out off the last ball of the over when victory is two scoring shots away or could there have there be a better strategy? Using Stoinis and Hazlewood’s partnership as an example, this article explores the unconventional and overlooked method of entrusting the number 11 with the strike as well as the scenarios that may have led to an unlikely win for Australia.
If there is a place to achieve the impossible, Eden Park is the place to do it. It has been the home to a lot of memorable Kiwi run chases. New Zealand’s innings in the second ODI in 2007, finished off by none other than Brendon McCullum to successfully chase down 337 is a comeback that immediately comes to mind. With woman sized boundaries measuring only 58 meters, it is an extremely friendly place to swing a bat. It makes sense then that historically the team batting second has won the majority (60%) in all ODI’s over the last 10 years.
Stoinis came in at number 7 in the 14th over when Australia were 54/5. This left him with the mammoth task of reaching the 287-run target whilst not throwing away his wicket. To make the task even more difficult, Australia had to double the current run rate to win.
Fast forwarding to the 47th and most critical over of the game where Australia is 9 down with Josh Hazlewood at the other end. Stoinis had done the hard yards, reeling in the run rate from a steep 10 an over to just above 2. He had somehow managed to stay on strike almost four consecutive overs and now needed 19 to win. Stoinis had the opportunity to run both 1’s and 2’s early in the 47th over, however quite rightly chose to remain on strike and hit 2 more sixes to bring up the highest ever scoring 10th wicket partnership with a scoreless partner. The task then became 7 off 3.1 overs. Australia were now the heavy favorites with their probability of winning increasing from 0 to 0.75 in just the last 6 overs. The Aussies objective was now no longer focused on chasing an improbable run rate, it was simply staying in to finish the job. Stoinis however seemed set on achieving this impossible task alone and continued to employ his last ball dash strategy, ultimately leading to Hazlewood’s diamond duck runout.
This strategy of a middle order batsman refusing their tail end partners on strike is very justified. The number 11 has a far greater probability of being dismissed and makes the last ball single the apparently rational choice. However, unless your partner is as inept a batsman as the hapless Chris Martin, a predictable single off the last ball for 4 consecutive overs would not seem a realistic way to go about it. Stoinis here had to weigh up the run-out risk vs risking the number 11 Hazlewood being on strike the next over.
The idea of your number 11 bowler facing even one ball at the death is extremely off putting. Recalling New Zealand’s position when they were faced with a similar situation 2 years earlier in the ODI World Cup/ Chappell-Hadlee. New Zealand bowled the Australians out for 146 and were clear favorites, however, found themselves 9 wickets down with only 5 runs left in their chase. Much like the case with Stoinis’ innings, the number of balls remaining was not a factor that concerned New Zealand. Trent Boult walks in on a hat-trick ball in the 23rd over and is faced with the task of facing the remaining two balls of the over. In this instance, the New Zealand captain Kane Williamson had no control over Boult’s exposure to the strike and was forced to watch from the other end. However, Trent Boult faced out the two balls delivered by an incredibly in form Mitchel Starc and Williamson went on to win the game in style hitting a six the next over. In this case number 11 could fulfill responsibility of keeping his wicket intact and contribute towards a victory.
If Stoinis was to win this game, it would have to be in the next over. Stoinis wants Hazlewood to face as few balls as possible while hitting the winning runs quickly to reduce the risk of Hazlewood ending up on strike. Due to Eden parks, small boundaries and Stoinis’ ability to hit big it seemed certain that Stoinis would be able to hit 6 runs off 6 balls. The fact that he was refusing to run even 2’s with Hazlewood suggest that these last 6 runs would be scored by hitting the rope. This also almost rules out the probability of Stoinis getting a single the next over. Ideally Stoinis would be on strike every ball but this is not always possible and looking at the alternatives may suggest otherwise. With Stoinis most probable shots to be 0, 4 or 6 it makes analysis of his alternative response simpler.
The most uncertainty arises around the number 11’s ability to bat. Hazlewood’s previous innings gives very little indication on what his ability is in this situation, let alone his general batting ability. Hazlewood up until this point had batted only 6 times in his 34 ODI’s. 3 of them in the second innings when the game was far out of reach. However, it must be noted that before claiming the award for the longest diamond duck, Hazlewood had not been dismissed in any of those 6 innings.
If no single was taken on the final ball in the 47th over, there are several possible scenarios for Hazelwood on strike and resulting in Australia’s victory.
- The most likely alternative would be having Hazlewood hit a single in the 48th over that would allow Stoinis to get back on strike. Ideally Hazlewood attempt a single early in the over and letting Stoinis finish it in the remaining balls. However, a single on ball 5 or even 4 could make it difficult for Stoinis to chase the last 5 runs down before the next over and could result in a similar position where another predicable single would have to be taken to keep Australia’s hopes alive.
- There is also a possibility of Hazlewood hitting a boundary, even the winning runs. This possibility of Hazlewood hitting the winning runs should not be overlooked. It is an unlikely scenario with Hazlewood’s ability and experience. However, Eden park’s short boundaries would favor any bat on ball that made it through or over the tightly set single stopping field which if done twice would give them a draw.
- The next is the probability of Hazlewood and facing surviving an entire over. Facing an inform bowler at the death is a daunting task for a number any number 11. It would be arguably improbable Hazlewood facing 6 in a row without getting dismissed or hitting runs.
- Lastly the possibility of Hazlewood and Stoinis sharing the strike ticking over the score. This must be deemed the most unlikely chosen scenario due to the small target, Hazlewood’s risk on strike and Stoinis’ success in scoring in multiples of 4 and 6.
These possibilities reveal another alternative to Stoinis running a single off the last ball. Due to the closely set field and Eden parks small size, a boundary off that last ball could be an attractive option. Stoinis’ recent streak of boundaries proved he was very capable of doing this and hitting a 6 or even a 4 would bring the target within one scoring shot. This would leave Hazlewood in an easier position. New Zealand’s field may have to adapt and push fielders back and stop any Hazlewood boundary possibility that would win Australia the game. This less aggressive field placement would increase the probability of Hazlewood getting a single and then Stoinis would able to easily win it. This alternative strategy leaves Australia’s prospect of victory in the hands of their number 11. The decrease in the runs required increases the probability of success of the alternative strategy success. In this case, the target was small and the run-out risk was extremely high and therefore the alternative should be employed over the last ball dash strategy. However, even if this an attractive alternative statistically, the fear of your tail end batsman seems to get on strike seems to be too much of a deterrent.
It can be concluded that Stoinis’ response in this situation was understandable, driven by the cricketer’s fear of the number 11 on strike. However, neglecting the possibility of trusting the number 11 was wrong, as given the small target, it offered a better probability of Australia winning. In this way, it is still extremely important to not justify the last ball dash strategy solely with the incompetence of the number 11 at the other end. Allowing the tail ender to face a few balls at the death instead of risking a certain run-out is unconventional but may be the best strategy for victory. Therefore Stoinis’ only flaw was his inability to realize his hither to successful strategy did not need alteration in final moments of the game. Despite the risk last ball dash strategy’s earlier success, as the required runs to win decreased, it becomes necessary to consider the other possibilities. The innings was otherwise faultless. He showed a remarkable amount of self-belief throughout, it was a shame he didn’t go on to make one of the greatest ODI innings of all time. Unfortunately, due to the result, his innings will remain slightly underrated. Stoinis looks like an exciting new talent and it will be great to see him continue to show this power and composure in the short format of the game.